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Abstract
This paper investigates infinitely repeated prisoner-dilemma games where the
discount factor is less than but close to 1. We assume that monitoring is truly imperfect
and truly private, there exist no public signals and no public randomization devices, and
players cannot communicate and use only pure strategies. We show that implicit
collusion can be sustained by Nash equilibria under a mild condition. We show that the
Folk Theorem holds when players’ private signals are conditionally independent. These
results are permissive, because we require no conditions concerning the accuracy of
private signals such as the zero likelihood ratio condition. We also investigate the
situation in which players play a Nash equilibrium of a machine game irrespective of
their initial states, i.e., they play a uniform equilibrium. We show that there exists a
unique payoff vector sustained by a uniform equilibrium, i.e., a unique uniformly
sustainable payoff vector, which Pareto-dominates all other uniformly sustainable
payoff vectors. We characterize this payoff vector by using the values of the minimum
likelihood ratio. We show that this payoff vector is efficient if and only if the zero
likelihood ratio condition is satisfied. These positive results hold even if each player has
limited knowledge on her opponent’s private signal structure.
Keywords: Repeated Prisoner-Dilemma Games, Private Monitoring, Conditional
Independence, Folk Theorem, Uniform Sustainability, Zero Likelihood Ratio Condition,
Limited Knowledge.3
1. Introduction
This paper investigates infinitely repeated prisoner-dilemma games where the
discount factor is less than but close to 1. We assume that players not only imperfectly
but also privately monitor their opponents’ actions. Players cannot observe their
opponents’ actions directly, but can only observe their own private signals which are
drawn according to a density function over closed intervals conditional upon the action
profile played. There are no public signals.
The paper investigates the possibility that implicit collusion can be sustained by
Nash equilibria. We show that there exist Nash equilibrium payoff vectors which are
better than the one-shot Nash equilibrium payoff vector if the minimum of the
likelihood ratio indicating whether the opponent has chosen the right action satisfies a
mild condition. Furthermore, we show that an efficient payoff vector is approximated by
a Nash equilibrium payoff vector if this minimum likelihood ratio is equal to zero, i.e.,
if for each player there exists a private signal that indicates accurately whether her
opponent has chosen the right action. Note that as this signal is not public this
efficiency result is not immediate.
Given the zero likelihood ratio condition, it is well known that efficiency is
attainable in the limit of the discount factor even with imperfect monitoring provided
that monitoring is public. With private monitoring the problem is more delicate. Even
when a player is certain that a particular opponent has deviated, this certainty will
typically not be shared by the other players and they will be unable to coordinate on an
equilibrium which punishes the deviant in the continuation game. Nevertheless a more
complicated argument establishes that efficiency is attainable under this condition.
We also intensively investigate the situation in which players’ private signals are
conditionally independent, i.e., players can obtain no information on what their
opponents have observed by observing their own private signals. We show, as the main
theorem of this paper, that the Folk Theorem holds, i.e., every feasible and individually
rational payoff vector is approximated by a Nash equilibrium payoff vector, provided
that players’ private signals are conditionally independent. This result is permissive,
because we require no informational conditions concerning the accuracy of players’
private signals such as the zero likelihood ratio condition.
The study of repeated games with private monitoring is relatively new. Most earlier
work in this area has assumed that monitoring is either perfect or public and has
investigated only perfect public equilibria. Perfect public equilibrium requires that the
past histories relevant to future play are common knowledge in every period. This4
common knowledge property makes equilibrium analyses tractable, because players’
future play can always be described as a Nash equilibrium. When monitoring is only
private, however, it is inevitable that an equilibrium sustaining implicit collusion
depends on players’ private histories, and therefore, the past histories relevant to future
play are not common knowledge. This makes equilibrium analyses much more difficult,
especially in the discounting case, because players’ future play cannot be described as a
Nash equilibrium.
To the best of my knowledge, Radner (1986) is the first paper on repeated games
with private monitoring. Radner assumed no discounting, and showed that every
feasible and individually rational payoff vector can be sustained by a Nash equilibrium.
1
The two papers by Matsushima (1990a, 1990b) appear to be the first to investigate the
discounting case. Matsushima (1990a) provided an Anti-Folk Theorem, showing that it
is impossible to sustain implicit collusion by pure strategy Nash equilibria when private
signals are conditionally independent and Nash equilibria are restricted to be
independent of payoff-irrelevant private histories. The present paper establishes the
converse result: the Folk Theorem holds when we use pure strategy Nash equilibria
which can depend on payoff-irrelevant private histories.
Matsushima (1990b) conjectured that a Folk Theorem type result could be obtained
even with private monitoring and discounting when players can communicate by
making publicly observable announcements. Subsequently, Kandori and Matsushima
(1998) and Compte (1998) proved the Folk Theorem with communication.
Communication synthetically generates public signals and consequently it is possible to
conduct the dynamic analysis in terms of perfect public equilibria as in the paper by
Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1994) on the Folk Theorem with imperfect public
monitoring. The present paper assumes that players make no publicly observable
announcements.
Interest in repeated games with private monitoring and no communication has been
stimulated by a number of recent papers, including Sekiguchi (1997), Bhaskar (1999),
Piccione (1998), and Ely and Valimaki (1999). Sekiguchi (1997) investigated a
restricted class of prisoner-dilemma games on the assumption that monitoring was
almost perfect and that players’ private signals were conditionally independent.
Sekiguchi was the first to show that an efficient payoff vector can be approximated by a
mixed strategy Nash equilibrium payoff vector even if players cannot communicate. By
                                                
1 See also Lehler (1989) and Fudenberg and Levine (1991) for the study of repeated games with
no discounting and with private monitoring.5
using public randomization devices, Bhaskar (1999) extended Sekiguchi’s result to
more general prisoner-dilemma games.
Piccione (1998) and Ely and Valimaki (1999) also considered repeated prisoner-
dilemma games when the discount factor is close to 1, and provided their respective
Folk Theorems. Both papers constructed mixed strategy equilibria in which each player
is indifferent between the right action and the wrong action irrespective of her
opponent’s possible future strategy. Piccione used dynamic programming techniques
over infinite state spaces, while Ely and Valimaki used two-state Markov strategies.
Both papers investigated only the almost-perfect monitoring case, and most of their
arguments rely heavily on this assumption. However, in the last section of his paper,
Piccione provides an example in which implicit collusion is possible even if players’
private observation errors are not infinitesimal.
Mailath and Morris (1998) investigate the robustness of perfect public equilibria
when monitoring is almost public, i.e., each player can always discern accurately which
private signal her opponent has observed by observing her own private signal. The
present paper does not assume that monitoring is almost public.
In consequence, this paper has many substantial points of departure from the earlier
literature. We assume that there exist no public signals, players make no publicly
observed announcements, and there exist no public randomization devices. We do not
require that monitoring is either almost perfect or almost public. Hence, the present
paper can be regarded as the first work to provide affirmative answers to the possibility
of implicit collusion with discounting when monitoring is truly imperfect and truly
private.
As such, this paper may offer important economic implications within the field of
industrial organization. In the real economy, communication between rival firms’
executives is restricted by Anti-Trust Law, on the assumption that such communication
enhances the possibility of a self-enforcing cartel agreement.
2 Moreover, in reality,
firms usually cannot directly observe the prices or quantities of rival firms and the
aggregate level of consumer demand is stochastic. Instead, each firm’s only information
about its opponents’ actions within any particular period, is its own realized sales level
and, therefore, each firm cannot know what its opponents have observed. These
                                                
2 See such industrial organization textbooks as Scherer and Ross (1990) and Tirole (1988).
Matsushima (1990b), Kandori and Matsushima (1998) and Compte (1998) provided a
justification of why communication is so important for the self-enforcement of a cartel
agreement.6
circumstances tend to promote the occurrence of price wars, as each firm cannot know
whether a fall in its own sales is due to a fall in demand or a secret price cut by a rival
firm. In this way, it has been widely believed that a cartel agreement is most likely to be
breached when each firm’s monitoring of its opponents’ actions is truly private.
3 In
contrast, the present paper shows that collusive behavior is possible even if
communication is prohibited and each firm obtains no public information on the prices
or quantities of its rivals.
This paper is closely related to Piccione (1998) and Ely and Valimaki (1999),
particularly the latter. This paper is also related to Matsushima (1999), which
investigated the impact of multimarket contact on implicit collusion in the imperfect
public monitoring case and provided the efficiency result by using the idea of a review
strategy equilibrium. Our equilibrium construction may be viewed as extending the
equilibrium construction of Ely and Valimaki combined with that of Matsushima to
general private signal structures.
The latter part of this paper, i.e., Sections 7 and 8, are devoted to considering
situations in which players have limited knowledge on their opponents’ strategies. Both
sections provide their respective sets of multiple possible strategies for each player.
Each player only knows that her opponent plays one of these possible strategies, but has
no idea which strategy is the correct one. We assume that it is common knowledge that
the played strategy profile satisfies the Nash equilibrium property, while which Nash
equilibrium is the correct one is not common knowledge.
4 The purpose of these sections
is to clarify the possibility of implicit collusion even when players have limited
knowledge on their opponents’ strategies.
Section 7 regards a repeated prisoner-dilemma game as a machine game as explored
by, for instance, Rubinstein (1984), Neyman (1985), and Abreu and Rubinstein (1987).
A player behaves according to a machine which is defined as a combination of an
output function, a transition function, and an initial state of machine. A rule for player
                                                
3 Stigler (1964) is closely related. Moreover, Green and Porter (1984) investigated repeated
quantity-setting oligopoly when the market demand is stochastic and firms cannot observe the
quantities of their rival firms. They assumed that firms can publicly observe the market-clearing
price. In contrast, the present paper assumes that there exist no publicly observable signals such
as the market-clearing price.
4 In the analysis of situations in which strategies are not common knowledge, Bernheim (1984)
and Pearce (1984) introduced the concept of rationalizability instead of assuming that it is
common knowledge that players’ behaviors are described as a Nash equilibrium.7
i is defined as a combination of an output function and a transition function. We
assume that players’ rules are common knowledge, but their initial states are not
common knowledge. Each player knows that her opponent's play is consistent with this
rule, but has no idea which initial state is the correct one. A rule profile is called a
uniform equilibrium if every machine (i.e., rule plus initial state) profile consistent with
this rule profile is a Nash equilibrium. Hence, all possible Nash equilibria are
interchangeable. A payoff vector is called uniformly sustainable if there exists a
uniform equilibrium such that every machine profile consistent with it induces virtually
the same payoff vector as the given payoff vector. Hence, all possible Nash equilibria
virtually induce this given payoff vector, i.e., are virtually payoff-equivalent.
We show that there exists a unique uniformly sustainable payoff vector which
Pareto-dominates all other uniformly sustainable payoff vectors. This Pareto-
dominance property is in sharp contrast with the fact that there exist a
continuum/countable set of Pareto-undominated perfect equilibrium payoff vectors. We
characterize this Pareto-dominant uniformly sustainable payoff vector by using the
values of the minimum likelihood ratio. We show that this payoff vector is efficient if
and only if the zero likelihood ratio condition is satisfied. Hence, the zero likelihood
ratio condition is not only sufficient but also necessary for efficient uniform
sustainability.
Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1986) is related to this analysis. They investigated
symmetric repeated oligopoly with imperfect public monitoring modeled by Green and
Porter (1984), and characterized the optimal symmetric equilibrium, where the future
punishment is triggered by the observation of the public signals which correspond to the
minimum likelihood ratio. This optimal symmetric equilibrium is efficient if and only if
the minimum likelihood ratio is equal to zero. In contrast with their work, the present
paper does not assume that the model is symmetric, equilibria are restricted to be
symmetric, or that there exists any public signal.
Ely and Valimaki (1999) is also, and more closely, related. In their analysis of
Prisoner-Dilemma games with almost-perfect monitoring, Ely and Valimaki
constructed interchangeable Markov strategy Nash equilibria. A point of difference is
that Ely and Valimaki did not require that Nash equilibria are virtually payoff-
equivalent, whereas the present paper does.
Section 8 considers the situation in which players have limited knowledge on their
private signal structure. Each player knows her own private signal structure, i.e., knows
the conditional density function of her own private signal, but does not  know her
opponent’s private signal structure, i.e., does not know the conditional density function8
of her opponent’s private signal. Each player’s strategy depends on her own private
signal structure, but is independent of her opponent’s private signal structure.
We provide the following two positive results. We reconsider the sustainability of
Nash equilibria and clarify whether the Folk Theorem can be achieved by using only
players’ strategies which depend only on their own private signal structures. Each
player behaves according to a mapping which assigns a strategy for this player to each
possible conditional density function over her own private signal. Their mappings are
assumed to be common knowledge, but each player does not know which strategy in the
range of the opponent’s mapping is actually played. We require that every pair of
strategies in the ranges of their mappings are Nash equilibria. We establish the Folk
Theorem with interchangeability and virtual payoff-equivalence. That is, if it is
common knowledge among players that private signals are conditionally independent,
then, for every feasible and individually rational payoff vector, there exists a profile of
mappings assigning each possible private signal structure a Nash equilibrium which
induces approximately the same payoff vector as this payoff vector. Hence, all possible
Nash equilibria can be regarded as being interchangeable and virtually payoff-
equivalent.
We also reconsider uniform sustainability discussed in Section 7 and show that the
Pareto-dominant uniformly sustainable payoff vector can be uniformly sustained by
using only players’ rules which depends only on their own private signal structures.
Each player behaves according to a mapping which assigns a rule for this player to each
possible conditional density function over her own private signal. Their mappings are
assumed to be common knowledge, but each player does not know which rule in the
range of the opponent’s mapping is the correct one. We require that every pair of rules
in the ranges of their mappings are uniform equilibria. Hence, all possible uniform
equilibria can be regarded as being interchangeable. We do not require the conditional
independence assumption. We show that the arguments in Section 7 hold even if each
player only knows her own private signal structure, i.e., we show that there exists a
profile of mappings which assigns each possible private signal structure a uniform
equilibrium such that every machine profile consistent with it induces virtually the same
payoff vector as the associated Pareto-dominant payoff vector.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 defines the model. Section 3
provides a theorem which characterizes a subset of sustainable payoff vectors. Section 4
gives the proof of this theorem. Section 3 shows that efficiency is sustainable under the
zero likelihood ratio condition. Section 5 assumes conditional independence and
provides the Folk Theorem. Section 6 gives the proof of this Folk Theorem. Section 79
shows that there exists the Pareto-dominant uniformly sustainable payoff vector, and
this payoff vector is efficient if and only if the zero likelihood ratio condition is
satisfied. Section 8 considers two scenarios in which each player has limited knowledge
on her opponent’s private signal structure, and shows that the positive results provided
in the previous sections hold in each of these scenarios. Section 9 concludes.10
2. The Model
An infinitely repeated prisoner-dilemma game Γ () δ = (( , , ) , , ) , Au p ii i i Ω = 12 δ  is
defined as follows. In every period  t ≥ 1, players 1 and 2 play a prisoner-dilemma game
(,) , Au ii i = 12. Throughout this paper, we will denote  ji ≠ , i.e., denote  j = 1 when  i = 2,
and  j = 2 when i = 1.  Player  is '  set of actions is given by  Ac d ii i = {, } .  L e t
AAA ≡× 12 . Player is '  instantaneous payoff function is given by uA R i: → . We
assume that for every i = 12 , ,  uc i() = 1,  ud i() = 0,  udc x ij i (/ ) =+ > 1 1, and
ucd y ij i (/ ) =− < 0, where we denote  cc c ≡ (,) 11  and  dd d ≡ (, ) 12 . We assume also
that  xx yy 12 12 +≤+ , i.e., the payoff vector  ( , ) 11  is efficient. The feasible set of payoff
vectors  VR ⊂
2 is defined as the convex hull of the set
{( , ),( , ),( , ),( , )} 11 00 1 1 12 1 2 +− − + xy y x. The discount factor is denoted by  δ ∈ [,) 01 . At
the end of every period, each player  i  observes her own private signal  ω i . The set of
player  is '  private signals is defined as  Ω i ≡ [,] 01 . Let  ΩΩ Ω ≡× 12 . A signal profile
ωω ω ≡∈ (, ) 12 Ω  is determined according to a conditional density function  pa (|) ω .
Let  pa p a d ii j
jj





. We assume that  pa ii (| ) ω  is continuous w. r. t.
ω ii ∈Ω ,  pa ii (| ) ω > 0  for all aA ∈  and almost all ω ii ∈Ω , and  pa pa ii (| ) (| ) ⋅≠⋅ ′
for all aA ∈  and all  ′ ∈ aA a /{ }. Based on the above definitions, we may regard
ua i()  as the expected value defined by
ua ap a d ii i i i i i
ii
() ( , ) ( |) ≡
∈∫ πω ω ω
ω Ω
,
where  πω ii i a ( , ) is the realized instantaneous payoff for player i  when player i
chooses action  ai and observes her own private signal  ω i.
Remark: An example is the model of a price-setting duopoly. Actions  ci and  di are
regarded as the choices of high price  λ ii c ( ) and low price  λ ii d ( ), respectively, for
firm  is '  commodity, where  λλ ii i i cd () () >≥ 0. Firm  is '  sales when private signal  ω i
is observed is given by  qii () ω ≥ 0. The realized instantaneous profit for firm  i  is
given by πω λ ω ω ii i i i ii i ii aa qC q (,) () () (() ) =− , where Cq ii () ≥ 0 is firm is '  total
cost of production.




t = = (( ) , ( ) ) τωτ τ 1, where aA ii () τ ∈  is the action chosen by player i  and
ωτ ii () ∈Ω  is the private signal observed by player  i  in period  τ . The null history for
player  i  is denoted by  hi
0. The set of all private histories for player  i  is denoted by11
Hi. A (pure) strategy for player  i  is defined as a function  sH A ii i : → . The set of
strategies for player  i  is denoted by  Si. Let  SSS ≡× 12 . Player  is '  normalized long-
run payoff induced by a strategy profile sS ∈  is given by











. Let  vs v s v s (,) ( (,) , (,) ) δδ δ ≡ 12 . A strategy profile
sS ∈  is said to be a Nash equilibrium in  Γ () δ  if for each  i = 12 ,  and every  ′ ∈ sS ii ,
vs vs s ii i (,) (,/ ) δδ ≥ ′ . Since each player’s private signal structure has almost full
support, the set of Nash equilibrium payoff vectors is equivalent to the set of sequential
equilibrium payoff vectors.
Definition 1: A payoff vector  vv v R =∈ (,) 12
2 is sustainable if for every  ε > 0 and




1 satisfying  lim
m
m
→+∞ = δ 1, there exists




1 such that for every large enough
m = 12 ,, . . . ,  s




mm −≤ ≤ +
→+∞ (,) l i m ( , ) (,) εε δ εε .
Note that the set of sustainable payoff vectors is compact. We denote by  si hi
t | t h e
strategy for player  i  induced by  si  after the private history  hH i
t
i ∈  occurs.12
3. Efficiency

















































We assume that such a function  Li exists and is continuous w. r. t.  ω ii ∈Ω . We define
the minimum likelihood ratio function for player  i ,  LA R i:
2 → , by
La a L a a i ii
ii
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(, / ) 1
,                   ( 1 )
then it holds that  vv > . We define a subset VV
* ⊂  by the convex hull of the set
{( , ), ,( , ),( , )} 00 1 21 2 vvv vv . See Figure 1.
[Figure 1]
Theorem 1: If inequalities (1) hold, then every  v V ∈
* is sustainable.
We provide the proof of Theorem 1 in the next section.
Theorem 2: If for each  i = 12 , ,










,                                ( 3 )13
then,  (,) 11  is sustainable.
Proof: Equalities (2) and inequalities (3) imply inequalities (1). Equalities (2) implies
v = (,) 11 . Hence, Theorem 1 implies that  ( , ) 11  is sustainable.
Q.E.D.
Theorem 2 states that the efficient payoff vector (1,1) can be approximately
sustained by a Nash equilibrium when the minimum likelihood ratio Lc cd i j (, / )
between c  and c d j /  is zero and the minimum likelihood ratio  Ld dc i i (, / )  between
d  and  d cj /  is less than a positive value 
1
1+ y j
 for each  i = 12 , . Note that Theorems
1 and 2 do not depend on any informational assumption such as conditional
independence.14
4. Proof of Theorem 1
The proof of Theorem 1 is divided into three steps.
5
Step 1: We show that for every  v V
+ ˛
* and every  v V
- ˛
*, if
v v v v ‡ > ‡
+ - ,
then,  v
+ ,  v
- ,  ( , ) v v 1 2
+ -  and  ( , ) v v 1 2
- +  are all sustainable.
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.    (4)
For each  i =12 , , choose  xj > 0 close to 0. From the continuity of  Li, we can choose
~ ~ ( ) w w x i i j i = ˛W  for each  i =12 ,  which satisfies
v
y v


















w ( ~, , / ) .                (5)
Let  ei > 0 and 
~
li >0 be positive real numbers which are close to 0.
Consider the following Markov strategies with two states, i.e., “play  ci”, and “play  di”.
When player  i s '  state is “play  ci” and player  i  observes a private signal which belongs to
(does not belong to) the interval  ( $ , $ ] w e w e i i i i - +  in the current period, player  i s '  state in
the next period will be “play  di” (“play  ci”, respectively). When player  i s '  state is “play
di” and player  i  observes a private signal which belongs to (does not belong to) the interval
(~ ~
, ~ ~
] w l w l i i i i - +  in the current period, player  i s '  state will be  “play  ci” ( “play  di”,
respectively). See Figure 2.
[Figure 2]
According to Ely and Valimaki (1999), we require that each player  i =12 ,  is indifferent
between the choice of action  ci and the choice of action  di irrespective of her own
private history. This incentive constraint is much stronger than sequential equilibrium but
                                                
5 This proof does not depend on the assumption of  x x y y 1 2 1 2 + £ + .15
drastically simplifies equilibrium analyses. In the following proof, we show that for every
discount factor close to 1, there exist  ei and 
~
li for each  i =12 ,  such that all of the four
Markov strategy profiles associated with different initial state profiles satisfy this incentive
constraint, i.e., are Nash equilibria, and virtually induce the payoff vectors  v
+ ,  v
- ,  ( , ) v v 1 2
+ -
and  ( , ) v v 1 2
- + .
Fix  i =12 ,  arbitrarily. Choose  ei > 0 close to 0. From equality (4), we can choose
$ $ ( ) v v j j i = e  which satisfies
p c d




i i j i
j
j j
i i i i i
i i i i i
( | )
( | / )
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( $ , $ ]
( $ , $ ]
w w
w w
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.                   (6)
Note that  $ $ ( ) v v j j i = e  tends towards  v j
+ as  ei approaches 0. We define
a a e
w w
w w e w e
j j i
i i j i
j j
p c d d
x v
i i i i i = ”
+ -
˛ - + ￿
( )
( | / )
$
( $ , $ ]
1
.                  (7)
Note that  a e j i ( ) tends towards 0 as  ei approaches 0.
We define  l l e i i i = ( ) and  l l e i i i = ( ) by
l l i i > >0,
p d c d y v i i j i j j j j
i i i i i
( | / ) ( )
( ~ , ~ ]
w w x a
w w l w l ˛ - +
- ￿ = + + ,
and
p d c d y v i i j i j j j
i i i i i
( | / ) ( )
( ~ , ~ ]
w w a
w w l w l ˛ - +
- ￿ = + .
Note that both  l e i i ( ) and  l e i i ( ) tend towards 0 as  ei approaches 0, because
a a e j j i = ( ) tends towards 0 as  ei approaches 0. Choose any continuous function
w w v v j j i j i i j j j = ﬁ +
- - ( , ):[ , ] [ , ] e x l l x  which satisfies that
w v j i j j ( ) l x = +
- ,
w v j i j ( ) l =
- ,
and for every  l l l i i i ˛[ , ],
p d c d y w i i j i j j i j
i i i i i
( | / ) ( ( ))
( ~ , ~ ]
w w l a
w w l w l ˛ - + ￿ = + .               (8)
Since  L d d c i i j (~ , , / ) w  is approximated by
p d d
p d c d
i i i
i i j i
i i i i i
i i i i i
( | )
( | / )
( ~ ,~ ]
( ~ ,~ ]
w w
w w
w w l w l
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Hence, the continuity of  wj i ( ) l  implies that there exists 
~ ~
( , ) l l e x i i i j =  such that
p d d
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.                 (9)
We define
~ ~ ( , ) ( , )(
~
( , )) (
~
( , )) v v w w j j i j j i j i i j j i i j = ” = e x e x l e x l e x .
Note that  ~ ~ ( , ) v v j j i j = e x  tends towards  v j
-  as  xj approaches 0, because 
~ ~
( , ) l l e x i i i j =








j j j v v ( $ ~ ) .                               (10)
Note that  dj tends towards 1 as  ei approaches 0, because  a e j i ( ) tends towards 0 as  ei
approaches 0.








ﬁ+¥ = d 1. The above arguments imply that there exists  ( , , , ) e x e x 1 1 2 2 1
m m m m
m=
¥  such that
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m
m m m m
ﬁ¥ = e x e x 1 1 2 2 0 00 0 ,
and for every large enough  m,
d d e x
m m m = = 1 2 1 ( , ) d e x 2 1 2 ( , )
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.                         (11)
From equalities (7) and (10), one gets17
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v v
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From equalities (8) and (10), one gets
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1 in the following way. For
each  i =12 , ,
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Note that there exist  D A R i: ﬁ  such that for every  h H i
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From equalities (11), (12), (13) and (14), one gets that
D c D d c v i i j i
m ( ) ( / ) $ = = ,  D d D c d v i i j i
m ( ) ( / ) ~ = = ,
and, for every  h H i
t
i ˛ , every  h H j
t
j
¢ ˛ , and for every  s S i i ˛  satisfying that
s s i a i
m
h a i i i
t
i i | | ( , ) ( ,( , )) w w =  for all  ( , ) a A i i i i w ˛ · W ,
v s s
v if s h c

















































t ( , | , | ) ( , , | ) d d ¢ ¢ = .                 (15)
Equalities (15) imply that for every  h H
t









h t t 1 2
1 2
¢  is a Nash
equilibrium in  G( ) d
m . Hence, we have completed the proof of Step 1.
Remark: Step 1 offers the following economic implication. Consider the example of the
price-setting duopoly presented in Section 2. The state profile “play  ( , ) c c 1 2 , i.e., play (high
price, high price)” is the situation of price collusion, while the profile “play  ( , ) d d 1 2 , i.e., play
(low price, low price)” is that of a price war. The remaining two profiles, “play  ( , ) c d 1 2 , i.e.,
play (high price, low price)”, and “play  ( , ) d c 1 2 , i.e., play (low price, high price)”, can be
regarded as the situations of a one-sided secret price cut. On the equilibrium path sustaining
implicit collusion outlined in Step 1, each of these state profiles emerges infinitely many times.
This is in contrast with the trigger strategy equilibrium used by Green and Porter (1984) in their
study of a quantity-setting duopoly with public monitoring, according to which, both the
situation of a price war and the situation of price collusion emerge infinitely many times but the
situation of a one-sided secret price cut never emerges.
Step 2: We show that for every positive integer  K > 0 and every  K sustainable payoff
vectors  v
[ ] 1 , ...,  v








1  is also sustainable.




1 arbitrarily, which satisfies  lim
m
m
ﬁ+¥ = d 1. Fix  e >0 arbitrarily. For every
k K =1,..., , let  ( )




1 be an infinite sequence of strategy profiles satisfying that for every
large enough  m=12 , ,...,  s
k m { , } is a Nash equilibrium in  G( ) d
m , and
v v s v
k
m
m k m k [ ] { , } [ ] ( , ) lim ( , ) ( , ) - £ £ +
ﬁ+¥ e e d e e .











i ( ) ( )
{ , } - =
1 0 ,
and for every  t K ‡ +1,







t ( ) (
~
)
{ , } ~ - =
1  if  t Kt k = + ~  and for every  t =1,...,~ t ,
(~( ), ~ ( )) ( ( ), ( )) a a K k K k i i i i t w t t w t = + + .
Note that
lim (( ) , ) lim
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1 1 e e e e .
Since  s
k m { , } is a Nash equilibrium in  G( ) d
m  for every large enough  m=12 , ,..., one gets
that  s
m
 is a Nash equilibrium in  G(( ) ) d
m K
1








1  is sustainable.
Step 3: Note that  ( , ) 0 0  is sustainable, because the repetition of the choices of  d  is the
Nash equilibrium in  G( ) d  for all  d ˛[0, ) 1 . Step 1 and inequalities (1) imply that  v,  v,
( , ) v v 1 2  and  ( , ) v v 1 2  are all sustainable. Since the set of sustainable payoff vectors is
compact, one gets from Step 2 that the set of sustainable payoff vectors is convex. Hence,
every payoff vector in the convex hull of the set  {( , ), ,( , ),( , )} 00 1 2 1 2 v v v v v , i.e., in  V
*, is
sustainable.
From these observations, we have completed the proof of Theorem 1.21
5. The Folk Theorem
This section assumes that players’ private signals are conditionally independent, i.e.,
pap a p a (|) ( |) ( |) ωω ω = 11 22  for all  aA ∈  and all  ω ∈Ω .
A feasible payoff vector  vV ∈  is said to be individually rational if it is more than or

























Note that the set of all feasible and individually rational payoff vectors is equivalent to
the convex hull of the set  {( , ),( , ), , }
[] [] 11 00
12 zz. See Figure 1 again.
We provide the Folk Theorem on the conditional independence assumption in the
following way.
Theorem 3: Suppose that players’ private signals are conditionally independent. Then,
every feasible and individually rational payoff vector is sustainable.
We provide the proof of Theorem 3 in the next section.
Theorem 3 is permissive, because we require no informational conditions
concerning the accuracy of players’ private signals such as the zero likelihood ratio
condition. Theorem 3 is in contrast with Matsushima (1990a). Matsushima showed that
the repetition of the one-shot Nash equilibrium is the only Nash equilibrium if players’
private signals are conditionally independent and only pure strategies are permitted
which are restricted to be independent of payoff-irrelevant histories. Here, a strategy
profile  s is said to be independent of payoff-irrelevant histories if for each  i = 12 ,,
every  t = 12 , ,..., every  hH i
t
i ∈ , and every  ′ ∈ hH i
t
i,















where  phs h ij
t
i
t ( | , ) is the probability anticipated by player i  that the opponent  j
observes private history hH j
t
j ∈  when player i  observes private history hH i
t
i ∈ ,
provided that both players behave according to  sS ∈ . Theorem 3 shows that the Folk
Theorem holds if players’ private signals are conditionally independent and only pure
strategies are permitted, but which depend on payoff-irrelevant histories.22
6. Proof of Theorem 3
The proof of Theorem 3 is divided into four steps.
Step 1: We show that the payoff vectors (1,1), (1,0), (0,1) and (0,0) are all sustainable.
Before constructing Nash equilibria, we consider the situation in which players T
times repeatedly play the prisoner-dilemma game. Denote aa a T
T = (() , . . . ,() ) 1,
cc c
T = (, . . . ,) ,  dd d
T = ( ,..., ), ( / ) ( / ,..., / ) cd cd cd j
T
jj = , and so on.
We choose a subset  ΩΩ ii
* ⊂  satisfying that
pc d pc d d ii i ii j i
ii ii
(| ) (| / )
**
ωω ω ω
ωω ∈∈ ∫∫ <
ΩΩ
.
We denote by  fr T a i
T *( , , ) the probability that the number of the observed private
signals for player  i  which belong to  Ω i
* is equal to  rT ∈ {, . . . , } 0 , conditional that  a
T






** ( , ,) ( , ,) ≡ ′
′= ∑
0
. We choose an infinite sequence
(() )
* rT iT =
∞
1 satisfying that

















,                         ( 1 7 )
and
lim ( ( ), , )
**
T ii








pc d d pc d ii j i ii i
ii ii




.                ( 1 8 )
In the same way as Lemma 1 in Matsushima (1999), one gets that such an infinite
sequence ( ( ))
* rT iT =
∞
1 exists. The Law of Large Numbers implies that




→∞ = 0.                        ( 1 9 )
We choose another subset  ΩΩ ii
** ⊂  satisfying that





ωω ∈∈ ∫∫ <
ΩΩ
.
We denote by  fT a i
T **( , ) the probability that all of the observed private signals for
player  i  belong to  Ω i
**, conditional that  a
T  is played. Note that
lim
(, )








fT d c →∞ = 0.                             ( 2 0 )
















→∞ =∞ ,  γδ
mm T
m
≡ ( ) , lim
m
m
→∞ = γ 1,
and for each  i = 12 ,,















Hence, from equalities (16), (19) and (20), we can choose an infinite sequence








12 1 satisfying that  ξ i
m
∈ [,] 01  and  ξ
i
m ∈ [,] 01  for all  m= 12 ,, . . . ,
lim ( , )
m
m v
→∞ = 11 ,
lim ( , )
m
m v
→∞ = 00 ,
and for each  i = 12 ,  and every large enough  m,





































ξ {( ( ) , , ( / ) ) } ( )
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                                                   ( 2 1 )
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**( ,( / ) ) ( ).          ( 2 2 )
From the continuity of  pi, we can choose two subsets ΩΩ ii
*() ξ ⊂  and
ΩΩ ii














































































































































These equalities imply that the probability of  ωξ ii ∈Ω
*( ) is the same between the case24
of the choice of action profile  c and the case of the choice of action profile  cd j /,  t h e
probability of  ωξ ii ∈Ω
*( ) conditional on  ω ii ∈Ω
* is equivalent to that conditional on
ωξ ii ∉Ω
*( ), and the probability of ωξ ii ∈Ω
**( ) conditional on ω ii ∈Ω
** is the same
between the case of the choice of action profile  d  and the case of the choice of action
profile  dc j /.
For every m = 12 , ,..., we define two subsets of the T









m ** ⊂ , by
Φ i





1 ∈Ω : either ω i t () ∈ Ω i
* for at most
rT i
m *( ) periods, or  ωξ i
m
ii









1 ∈Ω : either ω i t () ∈Ω i
** for all
tT
m ∈ {,. . . , } 1 , or  ωξ i
m
i i
m T () ()
** ∉Ω }.
Based on the above definitions, we consider the following Markov strategies with
2T
m states, i.e., with states  (,) ci τ  and  (, ) di τ  for all  τ = 1,...,T
m. When player  is '
state is state ( , ) ci τ  (state ( , ) di τ ) , player i  chooses action ci (action di ,
respectively). When in a period  t  player  is '  state is state  (,) ci τ  (state  (, ) di τ ) and
τ < T
m, player is '  state in the next period t + 1 will be state ( , ) ci τ + 1  (state
(, ) di τ + 1 , respectively). When in a period t  player is '  state is ( , ) cT i
m  and the
vector of her private signals observed in the past  T
m periods  ( ( ),..., ( )) ωω i
m
i tT t −+ 1
belongs to  Φ i
m *  (does not belong to  Φ i
m * ), player  is '  state in the next period  t + 1 will
be state  (, ) ci 1  (state  (, ) di 1 , respectively). When in a period  t  player  is '  state is state
(, ) dT i
m  and ( ( ),..., ( )) ωω i
m
i tT t −+ 1  belongs to Φ i
m **  (does not belong to Φ i
m ** ),
player  is '  state in the next period t + 1 will be state (, ) ci 1  (state (, ) di τ + 1 ,
respectively). See Figure 3.
[Figure 3]
We denote by  si
m and si
m the strategies which start with state (, ) ci 1  and state





m /  and  ss
m
j
m /  are all Nash
equilibria, we will make the following two requirements; that for every  k = 01 ,, . . . ,  a n y
mixture of the choices of action  ci and action  di  in the  T
m times repeated play is less
preferable than the  T
m times repeated choice of action  ci or the  T
m times repeated
choice of action  di  in period  tk T
m =+ 1, irrespective of her own private history; and25
that for every  k = 01 , ,..., each player  i  is indifferent between  si
m and  si
m in period
tk T
m =+ 1, irrespective of her own private history. Note that the second requirement is
similar to that of Step 1 in the proof of Theorem 1. This requirement makes our analysis
more complicated than the simple application of the Law of Large Numbers in the study
of review strategies by, for example, Radner (1985). However, by using the lemmata in
Matsushima (1999), we can prove that both requirements are satisfied when  m is large
enough.


















1  for all tT














































m T 1 ∉Φ .
These strategies are regarded as a modification of the review strategy originated by
Radner (1985).
6 When the  T
m times repeated play passes the review of player  i , that




m T 1 ∈Φ  in the case of player  is '   T
m times repeated choice




m T 1 ∈Φ  in the case of player  is '  T
m times repeated
choice of action  di, player  i  will play collusive behavior during the next  T
m periods
according to  si
m. When the  T
m times repeated play fails the review of player  i , that is,




m T 1 ∉Φ  in the case of player  is '   T
m times repeated choice of




m T 1 ∉Φ  in the case of player is '  T
m times repeated
choice of action di, player i  will play punishment behavior during the next T
m
periods according to  si
m.
Equalities (21) and (22) imply that







m (,) (, /) δδ == ,                     ( 2 3 )
                                                     
6 See also Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce (1991), Matsushima (1999), Kandori and Matsushima
(1998), and Compte (1998). These papers made future punishment triggered by either bad
histories of the public signals during the review phase or bad messages announced at the last
stage of the review phase. In contrast, the present paper assumes the non-existence of such
public signals or messages.26







m (,) (,/) δδ == ,                     ( 2 4 )
and therefore,






m vs vs s
→∞ →∞ == δδ 1,
and






m vs vs s
→∞ →∞ == δδ0.





m /  and  ss
m
j
m /  are all Nash equilibria for every
large enough  m. Suppose that there exists  sS jj ∈  such that
vs s v j
mm
jj
m (, /) δ > ,
and










The definition of  Ω ii
m *() ξ  and the conditional independence assumption imply that we
can assume that there exists  ( ( ),..., ( )) aa T jj
m 1  such that
sh at jj
t
j () ( )
− =
1  for all  tT





In the same way as Lemma 4 in Matsushima (1999), one gets that, given that  m is large
enough, player  j can obtain a positive gain from deviation by choosing action  d j
either only in the first period or in all  T
m periods. Hence, we can assume that either
ad jj () 1 =  and at c jj () =  for all tT
m = 2,..., , or at d jj () =  for all tT
m = 1,..., .
Equalities (23) imply that player  j cannot obtain any gain from deviation by choosing
action  d j in all  T
m periods. Moreover, In the same way as Lemma 5 in Matsushima
(1999), we can show that, given that  m is large enough, player  j cannot obtain any
gain from deviation by choosing action  d j only in the first period, as follows. Note that
the difference of the probabilities that event Φ i
m *  does not occur (i.e., player  j is










m{ pc d d pc d ii j i ii i
ii ii
(| / ) (| ) }
**
ωωω ω
ωω ∈∈ ∫∫ −
ΩΩ
fr T T c ii
mm T
m ** (( ) , , ) −
− 1
1 .
Hence, the difference of the (un-normalized) long-run payoffs for player  j  in the case
of the  T
m times repeated choice of action  c j  and the case of the deviation by choosing
action  d j only in the first period is equal to
x j − ξ i














fr T T c ii
mm T




















and  lim ( , )
m
m v







































and therefore, the limit of this difference in long-run payoffs is equal to














lim ( ( ), , )
**
T ii




which is less than zero, because of inequality (18). Hence, player  j  have no incentive
to deviate by choosing action d j only in the first period. This, however, is a
contradiction.
Next, suppose that there exists  sS jj ∈  such that
vs s v j
m m
j j
m (,/) δ > ,
and










The definition of  Ω ii
m *() ξ  and the conditional independence assumption imply that we
can assume that there exists  ( ( ),..., ( )) aa T jj
m 1  such that
sh at jj
t
j () ( )
− =
1  for all  tT





Let  τ ∈ { ,..., } 1 T
m  denote the number of the periods in which  at c jj () = . Without loss
of generality, we can assume that player  j chooses action  cj in the last  τ  periods, i.e.,
from period  T
m −+ τ 1 to period  T
m. Note that
fTa p d c d p d d i
mT














= qf T d i
mT

























































































We denote by  v j() τ  the right hand side of these equalities, i.e.,
























































m () ( , ) ( , ) ( ) 0 === δδ .                ( 2 6 )






















m −> 1 0, implies that for every  τ ∈ { ,..., } 1 T
m ,
vv jj ()( ) ττ +− ≥ 10  i f   vv jj () ( ) ττ −− ≥ 10 ,
and
vv jj () ( ) ττ −− ≤ 10  i f   vv jj ()( ) ττ +− ≤ 10 .
This, together with equalities (26), implies that
vv jj () () 0 ≥ τ  for all  τ ∈ { ,..., } 1 T
m .
Hence, it must hold that  vs s v j
m m
j j
m (,/) δ ≤ , but this is a contradiction.





m /  and  ss
m
j
m /  are all
Nash equilibria for every large enough  m. Hence, (1,1), (1,0), (0,1) and (0,0) are all
sustainable.
Step 2: We show that  z
[] 1  and  z
[] 2  are both sustainable. Consider  z
[] 1  only. We can
prove that  z
[] 2  is sustainable in the same way.
Before constructing Nash equilibria, we consider the situation in which players M
times repeatedly play the prisoner-dilemma game. We choose a subset ΩΩ 22
+ ⊂
satisfying that
pd c d pd d 22 1 2 22 2
22 22





We denote by  fr M a
M
2
+ ( , , ) the probability that the number of the observed private
signals for player 2 which belong to  Ω 2
+  is equal to  rM ∈ {, . . . , } 0 , conditional that
a








≡ ′ ∑ ( , , ) ( , , ). We choose an infinite sequence29
(() ) rM M 21
+
=
∞  satisfying that
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and
lim ( ( ), ,( / ) )
M













ypd d pd c d {( | ) ( | / ) } ωω ω ω
ωω ΩΩ
         ( 2 9 )
In the same way as Lemma 1 in Matsushima (1999), one gets that such an infinite
sequence ( ( )) rM M 21
+
=
∞  exists. The Law of Large Numbers implies that




++ = 22 0.                        ( 3 0 )
We choose a positive real number  b > 0 arbitrarily, which is less than but close to
1
1 1 + y
,
satisfying that
lim ( ( ), ,( / ) )
M






bp d d p d c d
1
2
22 2 22 1 2 1
22 22
() { ( | ) ( | / ) } −−
∈∈




vb y x b
* (, ) ( ) ( , ) ≡− + +− 12 11 1 1 .
Note that  v
* approximates  z
[] 1 , and
vz 11
1 0
*[ ] >= .

























→∞ =− χ 1 .                                   ( 3 1 )
For every m = 12 , ,..., we define a subset of the  M








m {( ( ),..., ( )) ωω 22 2 1 M
mM
m
∈Ω :  ω 2() t ∈ Ω 2




+ ( ) periods}.




1 be the infinite sequence of the two strategy profiles specified in Step 1.30
Consider the following strategy profile. In the first  M
m periods, player 1 always
chooses action  c1 and player 2 always chooses action  d2. From period  M
m + 1, player
1 certainly plays the strategy  s
m
1 . From period  M





2 ) if the vector of the observed private signals  ( ( ),..., ( )) ωω 22 1 M
m  passes
the review, i.e., belongs to Φ 2
+  (fails the review, i.e., does not belong to Φ 2
+ ,
respectively). See Figures 4.1 and 4.2.
[Figure 4.1]
[Figure 4.2]
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following way.
sh c d
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m y +
++ χ
mm m M m FrM M dc v
m
{( ( ) , , ( /)) 22 1 1
+−
++ (( ( ) , , ( / ) ) ) } 1 22 1 1 FrM M dc v







[, ] δ = () ( ) 11 2 −+ χ
m x + χ
mm v2 .
Note from equalities (27), (30) and (31) that
lim ( , ) ( , )
[, ]
m
mm vs b yx
→∞ =− + δ
1
12 1 +− = () ( , )




1  approximates  z
[] 1  for every large enough  m.
We show below that  s
m [, ] 1  is a Nash equilibrium for every large enough  m. Step 1
and the definition of  s
m [, ] 1  imply that ( | , | )










 is a Nash equilibrium for
every ( , ) hh
MM
mm
12  and every large enough m. Since players’ private signals are
conditionally independent and action d2 is dominant in the component game, the31
repeated choice of action d2 during the first  M
m periods is the best response for
player  2. Hence, all we have to do is to check that the repeated choice of action  c1
during the first  M
m periods is the best response for player 1 for every large enough  m.






1 (, ) ( )














From the conditional independence assumption, we can assume that there exists
( ( ),..., ( )) aa M
m





1 () ( )
− =  for all  tM






In the same way as Lemma 4 in Matsushima (1999), one gets that, given that  m is large
enough, player 1 can obtain a positive gain from deviation by choosing action  d1 either
only in the first period or in all these  M
m periods. Hence, we can assume that either
ad 11 1 ()=  and  at c 11 ()=  for all  tM
m = 2,..., , or  at d 11 ()=  for all  tM
m = 1,..., . In
the same way as Lemma 5 in Matsushima (1999) and Step 1 in the proof of this theorem,
we can show that, given that  m is large enough, player 1 cannot obtain any gain from
deviation by choosing action d1 only in the first period, as follows. Note that the
difference of the probabilities that event Φ i
m +  does not occur (i.e., player  j is
punished) between in the case of ad d c d c
T
m




= (/) 1  is equal to











++ − − (( ) , , (/) ) .
Hence, the difference of the long-run payoffs for player 1 in the case of the  T
m times
repeated play of action  c1 and the case of the deviation by choosing action  d1 only in
the first period is equal to
























1 1 − .




































which, together with  lim ( , )
m
m v
→∞ = 11  and  lim ( , )
m
m v
→∞ = 0 0 , implies that the limit of this
difference in long-run payoffs is equal to32
























Mf r M M d c
M
M .
Since  b is close to 
1
1 1 + y
, this value is approximated by


























1 lim ( ( ), ,( / ) ),
which is less than zero, because of inequality (29). Hence, player 1 have no incentive to
deviate by choosing action  d1 only in the first period, when  m is large enough. This,
however, is a contradiction. Hence, it must hold that  at d 11 ()=  for all  tM
m = 1,..., .
Note from  lim ( , )
m
m v
→∞ = 0 0  and equality (30) that if  at d 11 ()=  for all  tM
m = 1,..., , then








++ lim { ( ( ), , )
m




++ (( ( ) , , ) ) } 1 22 1 FrM Md v
mm M m m
= 0.











1 (, ( , ) ) (, )
[, ] [, ] δδ <  for
every large enough  m, but this is a contradiction.
Hence, we have proved that  z
[] 1  is sustainable. Similarly,  z
[] 2  is sustainable too.
Step 3: Step 2 in the proof of Theorem 1 has proved that for every positive integer
K > 0 and every K  sustainable payoff vectors v
[] 1 , ..., v








1  is also
sustainable.
Step 4: Step 1 and Step 2 imply that (1,1), (0,0),  z
[] 1  and  z
[] 2  are all sustainable. Since
the set of sustainable payoff vectors is compact, one gets from Step 3 that the set of
sustainable payoff vectors is convex. Hence, every payoff vector in the convex hull of
the set  {( , ),( , ), , }
[] [] 00 11
12 zz , i.e., every feasible and individually rational payoff vector,
is sustainable.
From these observations, we have completed the proof of Theorem 3.33
7. Uniform Sustainability
In contrast with Sections 5 and 6, this section require no presumptions on the private
signal structure such as conditional indifference. This section regards  G( ) d  as a machine
game.
7 For each  i =12 , , fix the finite set of states of machine for player  i ,  Qi, arbitrarily,
where  | | Qi ‡2. Let  Q Q Q ” · 1 2. A rule for player  i  is defined by  s t i i i f ”( , ), where
f Q A i i i : ﬁ  is an output function,ti i i i Q Q : · ﬁ W  is a transition function, and  ti is
measurable w. r. t.  Wi. The set of rules for player  i  is denoted by  S i. Let  S S S ” · 1 2.
A  machine  for player  i  is defined as a combination of a rule and an initial state,
q s i i i i i q Q = ˛ · ( , ) S . In every period  t , player  i  chooses action  a t f q t i i i ( ) ( ( )) =
where  q t i( ) is the state for player  i  in period  t . The state for player  i  will transit from
q t i( ) to  q t q t T i i i I ( ) ( ( ), ( )) + = 1 t w  in period  t +1 when she observes private signal
wi t ( ) in period  t . Player  i s '  normalized long-run payoff induced by a machine profile











. The set of all machines for
player  i  is denoted by  Qi. Let  Q Q Q ” · 1 2. A machine profile  q ˛Q is said to be a
Nash equilibrium in  G( ) d  if for each  i =12 ,  and every  ¢˛ qi i Q ,  v v i i i i i ( , ) ( , / ) d q d q q ‡ ¢ .
A machine profile  q ˛Q is sometimes denoted by  ( , ) s q Q ˛ · S .
For every  i =12 ,  and every machine  q s i i i i q = ˛ ( , ) Q  for player  i , we define a
strategy  s S i i i ( ) q ˛  for player  i  and a function  q H Q i i i i ( ): q ﬁ  by
q h q Q i i i i i ( )( ) q
0 = ˛ ,
s h f q A i i i i i i ( )( ) ( ) q
0 = ˛ ,
and for every  t ‡1 and every  h H i
t
i ˛ ,
q h q h t Q i i i
t
i i i i
t
i i ( )( ) ( ( )( ), ( )) q t q w = ˛
-1 ,
and
s h i i i
t ( )( ) q = f q h i i i i
t ( ( )( )) q ˛Ai.
Let  s s s S ( ) ( ( ), ( )) q q q ” ˛ 1 1 2 2 . Note that  q is a Nash equilibrium in  G( ) d  if  s( ) q  is a
Nash equilibrium in  G( ) d . Note also that  v v s ( , ) ( , ( )) d q d q = .
We assume that players’ initial states are not common knowledge. We introduce the
following solution concept of a rule profile.
Definition 2: A rule profile  s ˛S  is a uniform equilibrium in  G( ) d  if  ( , ) s q  is a Nash
equilibrium in  G( ) d  for all  q Q ˛ .
                                                
7 For the definition of a machine game in the perfect monitoring case, see Rubinstein (1994,
Chapter 9). This section extends this definition to the private monitoring case.34
Definition 2 requires that players always play Nash equilibria irrespective of their initial
states. This means that all possible Nash equilibria are interchangeable.
Note that  s  is a uniform equilibrium in  G( ) d  if  s q ( , ) s  is a Nash equilibrium in  G( ) d
for all  q Q ˛ . Note also that
v q v s q ( ,( , )) ( , ( , )) d s d s =  for all  q Q ˛ .
Note that if  s  is a uniform equilibrium in  G( ) d , then, for each  i =1,2, every  q Q ˛  and
every  ¢ ˛ q Q i i,
v q v q q i i i ( ,( , )) ( ,( , / )) d s d s = ¢ ,
that is, each player can obtain the same payoff irrespective of her own initial state. However,
v q i( ,( , )) d s  is not necessarily equivalent to  v q q i j ( ,( , / )) d s ¢  for every  q Q ˛  and every
¢ ˛ q Q j j, i.e., the payoff which each player obtains may depend on her opponent’s initial state.
The following theorem states that for every discount factor there exist a uniform equilibrium
and a state profile, the combination of which sustains the payoff vector Pareto-dominating all
other payoff vectors induced by the machine profiles consistent with the other uniform
equilibria.
Theorem 4: For every  d ˛[ , ) 01 , there exists a uniform equilibrium  s ˛S  in  G( ) d
and  q Q ˛  such that for every uniform equilibrium  ¢˛ s S  in  G( ) d  and every
¢ ˛ q Q,
v q v s q ( ,( , )) ( , ( , )) d s d s ‡ ¢ ¢ .
Proof: Fix  d ˛[ , ) 01  arbitrarily, and consider a uniform equilibrium  s ˛S  in  G( ) d . Note
that for every  q Q ˛ ,
v q ( , , ) d s ‡ 0,
because each player  i  obtains at least payoff zero by always choosing action  di.
Suppose that there exists  i =12 ,  such that  f q d i i i ( ) =  for all  q Q i i ˛ . Since the choice
of action  d j is the dominant action for player  j  in the component game  G, it must hold that
f q d j j j ( ) =  for all  q Q j j ˛ .
Hence, one gets that both players repeatedly choose this dominant action profile  d , and
therefore,
v q ( , , ) d s = 0.
Next, suppose that for each  i =12 , , there exists  q Q i i ˛  such that  f q c i i i ( ) = . We can
check that for each  i =12 ,  there also exists  ¢˛ q Q i i such that  f q d i i i ( ) ¢ = . Otherwise, the
only best response for her opponent  j  is to always choose action  d j irrespective of her
state, but this is a contradiction. Hence, one gets from the definition of uniform equilibrium that35
each player  i  is always indifferent between the choices of  ci and  di, and therefore, she is
indifferent among all machines, i.e.,
v q v q i ( , , ) ( ,( , )/ ) d s d s q =  for all  qi i ˛Q  and all  q Q ˛ .
This implies that for every  s ˛S , every  ¢˛ s S , every  q Q ˛  and every  ¢ ˛ q Q, if  s
and  ¢ s  are both uniform equilibria in  G( ) d , then  ( , ) s s 1 2 ¢  is also a uniform equilibrium and
satisfies
v q q v q v q ( ,( , ),( , )) ( ( , , ), ( , , )) d s s d s d s 1 2 1 2 1 2 ¢ ¢ = ¢ ¢ .
These observations and the compactness of the set of uniform equilibria imply that there exist a
uniform equilibrium  s ˛S  and  q Q ˛  such that for every uniform equilibrium  ¢˛ s S  and
every  ¢ ˛ q Q,  v q v s q ( ,( , )) ( , ( , )) d s d s ‡ ¢ ¢ .
Q.E.D.
Theorem 4 is in sharp contrast with the fact that there exist a continuous/countable set of
Pareto-undominated perfect equilibrium payoff vectors. The following theorem provides an
upper-bound of all payoff vectors sustained by machine profiles consistent with uniform
equilibria.
Theorem 5: If  s ˛S  is a uniform equilibrium in  G( ) d , then for each  i =12 , ,
max[ , ] ( , , ) 0 v v q i i ‡ d s  for all  q Q ˛ .
Proof: Suppose that there exists  i =12 ,  such that  f q d i i i ( ) =  for all  q Q i i ˛ . Since  d  is
the dominant action profile, it must hold that
f q d j j j ( ) =  for all  q Q j j ˛ .
Hence, players repeatedly choose  d , and therefore,
v q ( , , ) d s = 0.
Suppose that for each  i =12 , , there exists  ~ q Q i i ˛  such that  f q c i i i (~ ) = . Fix  i =12 ,
arbitrarily, and let
W q v q i j i i i j j
i i





The uniform equilibrium property of  s  implies that for every  q Q ˛ ,
v q W q i i j ( , , ) ( ) d s = ,
and therefore,
W q u c f q i j i i j j ( ) ( ) ( , ( )) = - 1 d
+
˛ ￿ d w t w w
w
p c f q W q d j j i j j i j j j j
j j
( | , ( )) ( ( , ))
W
.
Choose  q Q j j
* ˛  which maximizes  W q i j ( ), and suppose that  W q i j ( )
* > 0. Note that








w t w w
w 1
p c f q W q W q d j j i j j i j j j i i j
j j




Since  W q W q i j j j i i ( ( , )) ( )
* * t w - £ 0 for all  w j j ˛W , one gets that  W q i i ( )
*  is less than or
equal to the value induced by the following conditional maximization.
max { ( , )










˛ ￿ p c a e d j j i j j j
j j
( | , ) ( ) } w w w
w W
subject to
u c a i i j ( , ) -
˛ ￿ p c a e d j j i j j j
j j
( | , ) ( ) w w w
w W
‡ u d a i i j ( , ) -
˛ ￿ p d a e d j j i j j j
j j
( | , ) ( ) w w w
w W
.
Since  W q i j ( )
* > 0 and  u c d y i j i ( / ) = - < 0, one gets that  a c j j =  must hold. Hence, the
value induced by the above conditional maximization is equivalent to
max {
: { } e R j W ﬁ + U 0 1-
˛ ￿ p c e d j j j j
j j
( | ) ( ) } w w w
w W
subject to





- p c e d j j j j ( | )} ( ) w w w ‡ xi.





L c c d x
L c c d
i j j
i j
( , / )
( , / )
,
which is equal to  vi.
Q. E.D.
We show below that the upperbound provided by Theorem 5 is the least upperbound.
We also show below that there exists a uniform equilibrium such that this upperbound is
approximately sustained by every machine profile consistent with it. We introduce the notion of
uniform sustainability as follows.
Definition 3: A payoff vector  ( , ) v v R 1 2













1 such that for every large enough  m,  s
m  is a uniform equilibrium in  G( ) d , and for
every  q Q ˛ ,
v v q v
m
m m - < < +
ﬁ+¥ ( , ) lim ( , , ) ( , ) e e d s e e .
Uniform sustainability requires that players always play Nash equilibria irrespective of their37
initial states and always obtain virtually the same payoff vector irrespective of their initial states,
that is, all possible machine profiles are interchangeable and virtually payoff-equivalent Nash
equilibria. Note that the set of uniformly sustainable payoff vectors is compact.
Theorem 6: If  v v >  and  v v v R = ˛ ( , ) 1 2
2 satisfies
v v v ‡ ‡ ,
then it is uniformly sustainable.
Proof: Fix  v V
+ ˛
* and  v V
- ˛
* arbitrarily, which satisfies  v v v v ‡ > ‡
+ - . Fix an infinite




1 arbitrarily, which satisfies  lim
m
m





be the infinite sequence of strategy profiles specified in Step 1 in the proof of Theorem 1. Let





1 in the following way. For each  i =12 , ,
f q c i
m
i i ( ) ,1 = ,
f q d i
m
i i ( ) =  for all  q q i i „ ,1,
t w i
m
i i i q q ( , ) , , 1 1 =  if  w w e w e i i i
m
i i
m ˇ - + ( $ , $ ],
t w i
m
i i i q q ( , ) , , 1 2 =  if  w w e w e i i i
m
i i
m ˛ - + ( $ , $ ],
and for every  q q i i „ ,1,
t w i
m
i i i q q ( , ) , = 1 if  w w l w l i i i
m
i i






i i i q q ( , ) , = 2 if  w w l w l i i i
m
i i
m ˇ - + ( ~ ~
, ~ ~
],
where  $ wi,  ~ wi,  ei
m, and  li
m were specified in Step 1 in the proof of Theorem 1. Note that









i ( ) = ,
and for every  q q i i „ ,1,









i ( ) = .




h t t 1 2
1 2
¢  is a Nash equilibrium in  G( ) d
m  for every  h H
t




¢ ˛ , one gets that  s q
m ( , ) s  is a Nash equilibrium in  G( ) d
m  for all  q Q ˛ , and
therefore,  s
m  is a uniform equilibrium in  G( ) d
m . Since for each  i =12 , ,





m ( ,( , )) ( , ( , )) $ d s d s = =  if  q q i i = ,1,





m ( ,( , )) ( , ( , )) ~ d s d s = =  if  q q i i „ ,1,
and we can choose  v
-  as close to  v
+  as possible, we have proved that  v
+  is uniformly
sustainable. Since the set of uniformly sustainable payoff vectors is compact, we have proved
that every  v satisfying  v v v ‡ ‡  is uniformly sustainable.
Q.E.D.38
Theorems 5 and 6 imply that  v  is the unique uniformly sustainable payoff vector
which Pareto-dominates all other uniformly sustainable payoff vectors.
Theorem 7: Suppose that for each  i =12 , , inequality (3) holds, i.e.,









Then,  ( , ) 11  is uniformly sustainable if and only if for each  i =12 , , equality (2) holds,
i.e.,
L c c d i j ( , / ) = 0.
Proof: We show the “if” part. Theorem 6, the definition of  v, and equalities (2) imply that if
( , ) 11 ‡ v > v, then  v is uniformly sustainable. Inequalities (3) and the definition of  v imply
( , ) 11 > v .
Hence,  ( , ) 11  is uniformly sustainable.
We show the “only if” part. Theorem 5 implies that for each  i =12 , ,
max[ , ] 0 1 v i ‡ .
Hence,  v = ( , ) 11  must hold, which implies equalities (2).
Q.E.D.
Theorem 7 implies that the efficient payoff vector  ( , ) 11  is uniformly sustainable if and
only if the zero likelihood ratio condition holds, and implies also that if this efficient
payoff vector is uniformly sustainable, then it Pareto-dominates all other uniformly
sustainable payoff vectors.39
8. Limited Knowledge on the Signal Structure
This section investigates the situation in which players have limited knowledge on their
private signal structures. Each player  i =12 ,  knows her own monitoring ability, i.e., knows
pi, but does not know her opponent’s monitoring ability, i.e., does not know  p j, and
therefore, behaves according to a strategy which does not depend on  p j. All notations in the
previous sections will be rewritten as being parameterized by  p, if necessary. For example,
we write  v v v
p p p [ ] [ ] [ ] ( , ) = 1 2
2 1  and  v v v
p p p [ ] [ ] [ ] ( , ) = 1 2
2 1  instead of  v v v =( , ) 1 2  and
v v v =( , ) 1 2 , respectively.
8.1. The Folk Theorem
We reconsider sustainability by Nash equilibrium. For each  i =12 , , fix an arbitrary
compact and nonempty subset  P i
* of conditional density functions on player  i s '  private
signal. Let  P P P
* * * ” · 1 2 . We assume that each player  i  only knows which element of  P i
*
is the correct conditional density function for her own private signal. We assume that it is
common knowledge that the correct conditional density function belongs to  P
*. We assume
also that it is common knowledge that players’ private signals are conditionally independent. A
mapping assigning each element of  P i
* a strategy for player  i  is denoted by  ri i i P S :
* ﬁ .
Let  r r r ” ( , ) 1 2 , and  r r r ( ) ( ( ), ( )) p p p ” 1 1 2 2 . Player  i  plays the assigned strategy
ri i i p S ( ) ˛  irrespective of her opponent’s monitoring ability  p P j j ˛
*.
The following theorem states that the Folk Theorem holds for every  p P ˛
* with the
above restrictions of limited knowledge.






1 satisfying  lim
m
m




1 such that for
every  p P ˛
* and every large enough  m,  r
m p ( ) is a Nash equilibrium in  G( ) d
m , and
v v p v
m
m m - < < +
ﬁ¥
( , ) lim ( , ( )) ( , ) e e d r e e .




1 arbitrarily, which satisfies  lim
m
m
ﬁ¥ = d 1. From the compactness of  P
*,
there exist  e > 0,  e > 0,  Y
W
i i P i * * : ﬁ 2  and  Y
W
i i P i ** * : ﬁ 2  for each  i =12 ,  such that
e e > ,
and for each  i =12 ,  and every  p P i i ˛
*,





i i i i i i
= =
˛ ˛ ￿ ￿ ( | ) ( | )
* ** ( ) ( )
w w w w
w w Y Y
,40
and





i i i i i i
= =
˛ ˛ ￿ ￿ ( | / ) ( | / )
* ** ( ) ( )
w w w w
w w Y Y
.
For each  i =12 ,  and every  p P i i ˛
*, We set the associated sets  Wi
* and  Wi
** introduced in
Step 1 of the proof of Theorem 3 equivalent to  Yi i p
*( ) and  Yi i p
**( ), respectively. Hence,
we can choose  ( ( ))
* r T i T =
¥










i m x x = =
¥
1 2 1 introduced in Step 1 of
the proof of Theorem 3 independently of  p P i i ˛
*. We denote  si
m pi ,  and  si
m pi ,  instead of
si
m and  si
m, respectively, which are the strategies specified in Step 1 of the Proof of Theorem















m p p s i ( )




m p p s
i ( )
, =  for all  p P i i ˛
*.
Step 1 in the proof of Theorem 3 implies that for every  p P ˛
* and every large enough  m,
( ( ), ( )) r r 1 1 2 2
m m p p ,  ( ( ), ( )) r r 1 1 2 2
m m p p ,  ( ( ), ( )) r r
1 1 2 2
m m p p  and  ( ( ), ( )) r r
1 1 2 2
m m p p  are all
Nash equilibria, approximately sustaining (1,1), (1,0), (0,1) and (0,0), respectively.
From the compactness of  P
*, there exist  e
+ > 0,  e
+ > 0, and  Y
W
i i P i + ﬁ :
* 2  for
each  i =12 ,  such that
e e
+ + > ,
and for each  i =12 ,  and every  p P i i ˛
*,

























For every  i =12 ,  and every  p P i i ˛
*, we set the associated set  F i
+ introduced in Step 2 of
the proof of Theorem 3 equivalent to  Yi i p









1 introduced in Step 2 of the proof of Theorem 3 independently of  p P i i ˛
*. We
denote  si
m pi [ , , ] 1  and  si
m pi [ , , ] 2  instead of  si
m [ , ] 1  and  si
m [ , ] 2 , respectively, which are the strategies
specified in Step 2 of the proof of Theorem 3. We specify  ( )
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m p p s i [ , ] [ , , ] ( )
1 1 =  and  ri
m
i i
m p p s i [ , ] [ , , ] ( )
2 2 =  for all  p P i i ˛
*.
Step 2 of the proof of Theorem 3 implies that for every  p P ˛
* and every large enough  m,
both  ( ( ), ( ))





m m p p  and  ( ( ), ( ))





m m p p  are Nash equilibria, approximately
sustaining  z
[ ] 1  and  z
[ ] 2 , respectively.
Fix a positive real number  e > 0, a positive integer  K, and  K feasible and individually
rational payoff vectors  v v
K { } { } ,...,
1 , arbitrarily. Suppose that for every  k K ˛{ ,..., } 1 , there
exists  ( )




1 such that for every  p P ˛
* and every large enough  m,  r
{ , }( )
k m p  is a
Nash equilibrium in  G( ) d
m , and41
v v p v
k
m
m k m k { } { , } { } ( , ) lim ( , ( )) ( , ) - < < +
ﬁ¥ e e d r e e .
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for all  t =1,...,~ t .
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1
 for every large
enough  m=12 , ,..., and
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1  is sustainable.
Since the set of payoff vectors satisfying the conditions in Theorem 3 is compact, we have




We reconsider uniform sustainability discussed in Section 7. We denote by  P
** the set of
all conditional density functions  p satisfying  v
p [ ] > v
p [ ]. For each  i =12 , , we define  P i
**
as the set of all conditional density functions  pi on player  i s '  private signal satisfying that
p a p a d i i j
j j





 for some  p P ˛
**. Note that players’ private signals are not
necessarily conditionally independent. We assume that each player  i  only knows which
element of  P i
** is the correct conditional density function for her own private signal. We
assume that it is common knowledge that the correct conditional density function belongs to
P
**. We also assume that each player  i  has no idea on what is the degree of correlation42
between their private signals. A mapping assigning each element of  P i
** a rule for player  i  is
denoted by  bi i i P :
** ﬁ S . Let  b b b ” ( , ) 1 2  and  b b b ( ) ( ( ), ( )) p p p ” 1 1 2 2 . Player  i
behaves according to the assigned rule  bi i i p ( )˛S  irrespective of her opponent’s monitoring
ability  p P j j ˛
**.
The following theorem states that for every  p P ˛
**, the Pareto-dominant uniformly
sustainable payoff vector  v
p [ ] can be uniformly sustained by a rule profile with the above
restrictions of limited knowledge.
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1 such that for every  p P ˛
** and every large enough  m,  b
m p ( ) is a uniform
equilibrium in  G( ) d
m , and for every  q Q ˛
v v p q v
p
m
m m p [ ] [ ] ( , ) lim ( , ( ), ) ( , ) - < < +
ﬁ¥ e e d b e e .




1 be the infinite sequence of rule profiles defined in the proof of Theorem 6,
where we assume  v v v v
p p [ ] [ ] ( , ) ( , ) - < < < +
- + e e e e . We will write
s s s
m p m p m p , , , ( , ) = 1 2
1 2  instead of  s
m . Here, we must note that, by definition,  si
m  depends








m p p i ( )
, =  for each  i =12 , , all  m=12 , ,..., and all  p P ˛
**.
The proof of Theorem 6 implies that for every  p P ˛
** and every large enough  m,
b s
m m p p ( )
, =  is a uniform equilibrium in  G( ) d
m , and for every  q Q ˛ ,





m m [ ] ( , ) lim ( , , ) lim ( , ( ), ) - < =
ﬁ¥ ﬁ¥ e e d s d b
< + v
p [ ] ( , ) e e .
Q.E.D.43
9. Conclusion and Future Research
The present paper investigated repeated prisoner-dilemma games with discounting where
players are sufficiently patient. We provided the Folk Theorem in terms of Nash equilibrium
when players’ private signals are conditionally independent. We also showed that the zero
likelihood ratio condition is necessary and sufficient for efficient uniform sustainability. These
results hold true even if players have limited knowledge on their opponents’ private signal
structures.
We have the following problems to be solved in future research.
We have proved the Folk Theorem on the conditional independence assumption by using
the review strategy equilibrium construction. The use of the review strategy relies on the
conditional independence assumption. Hence, whether the Folk Theorem holds even without
conditional independence is an open question. In the study of repeated games with public
monitoring, Matsushima (1989) provided an idea of equilibrium construction of punishment
and reward on hyperplanes. Subsequently, by using this idea, together with that of self-
generation explored by Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1990), Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin
(1994) provided the Folk Theorem in the public monitoring case. In order to discover the
Folk Theorem without the use of the review strategy, it would be a crucial step to apply the
idea of punishment and reward on hyperplanes to the private monitoring case.
The present paper considered only repeated prisoner-dilemma games. It is important to
clarify whether this paper can be extended to more general games. For example, we can
extend Theorem 1 to a class of games with more than two actions in the following way.
Suppose that a player  i  has an action  ¢ di  other than actions  ci and  di, and there exist
a ˛[0, ] 1  and  ¢ ˛ a [ , ] 01  such that
u c d u c u c d i i i i i ( / ) ( ) ( ) ( / ) ¢ £ + - a a 1 ,
p c d p c p c d j j i j j j j i ( $ | / ) ( $ | ) ( ) ( $ | / ) w a w a w ¢ > + - 1 ,
u d d u d u d c i i i i i ( / ) ( ) ( ) ( / ) ¢ £ ¢ + - ¢ a a 1 ,
and
p d d p d p d c j j i j j j j i ( ~ | / ) ( ~ | ) ( ) ( ~ | / ) w a w a w ¢ < ¢ + - ¢ 1 ,
where  $ w j and  ~ w j are the private signals for the opponent defined in the proof of Theorem 1.
Since the choice of action  ¢ di  is worse than a mixture of actions  ci and  di, player  i  have
no incentive to choose action  ¢ di  when her opponent plays the strategy constructed in the
proof of Theorem 1.
The study of private monitoring in general repeated games with more than two actions and
more than two players, and also in general stochastic games, should be expected to be started
in the near future.44
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